Financial fragility in emerging market countries: Firm balance sheets and the productive structure by Kalantzis, Yannick
Financial fragility in emerging market countries: Firm
balance sheets and the productive structure
Yannick Kalantzis
To cite this version:
Yannick Kalantzis. Financial fragility in emerging market countries: Firm balance sheets and
the productive structure. PSE Working Papers n2005-17. 2005. <halshs-00590808>
HAL Id: halshs-00590808
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00590808
Submitted on 5 May 2011
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 PARIS-JOURDAN SCIENCES ECONOMIQUES 
48, BD JOURDAN – E.N.S. – 75014 PARIS 
TEL. : 33(0) 1 43 13 63 00   –   FAX : 33 (0) 1 43 13 63 10 
www.pse.ens.fr 
 
 WORKING PAPER N° 2005 - 17 
 
 
 
 
Financial fragility in emerging market countries : 
 firm balance sheets and the productive structure 
 
Yannick Kalantzis 
 
 
 Codes JEL :E44, F32, F34, F43, O41 
 
 Mots clés :balance of payments crises, financial fragility, 
foreign currency debt, borrowing constraint, multiple 
equilibria. 
 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA  RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE – ÉCOLE DES HAUTES ÉTUDES EN SCIENCES SOCIALES 
ÉCOLE NATIONALE DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES – ÉCOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE 
 
Financial fragility in emerging market
countries: firm balance sheets and the
productive structure
Yannick Kalantzis ∗
(ENPC, PSE)
This version: May 2005
First draft: January 2005
Abstract
We build an overlapping generation model to study financial fragi-
lity in a two-sector small open economy. Firms are subject to a borrow-
ing constraint and there is a currency mismatch in the balance sheets
of the non-tradable sector. As a consequence, at a given point in
time, multiple equilibria may arise, which makes self-fulfilling balance
of payments crises possible. This state of financial fragility requires
that firms producing non-tradable goods are sufficiently leveraged and
that the relative size of the non-tradable sector is sufficiently large with
regards to the tradable sector.
We study under what conditions the endogenous evolution of these
two structural factors, firm balance sheets and the productive struc-
ture, along an equilibrium path, eventually leads to a financially fragile
state.
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The opening of developing economies to international finance in the last
three decades has led in a number of cases to balance of payments crises. The
Southern Cone crises at the beginning of the eighties, the Mexican crisis of
1994, the Asian crises of 1997 and the Argentine crisis of 2001 all took place
after the capital account had been liberalized. The suddenness of these crisis
episodes, the fact that some of them were triggered by contagion phenomena
and the absence of apparent changes in fundamentals before them have led
many analysts to conclude that they were of a self-fulfilling nature.
Models with multiple equilibria seem to be the proper analytical tool to
address the issue. In these models, the triggering of a crisis is an exogenous
and arbitrary event, often represented by a change in the value of a sunspot
variable. However, if the triggering of a crisis may be independent of funda-
mentals, the possibility of a crisis is not: fundamentals have not disappeared,
they have just stepped backward from financial crises to financial fragility.
Multiple equilibria models can thus be used to identify the structural char-
acteristics that make crises possible.
A first hint was given by Krugman (1999): in a static model of a small
open economy, he showed that self-fulfilling crises are possible when the for-
eign currency external debt is large enough relative to exports. But these
possible structural characteristics are endogenous and evolve over time, espe-
cially after an economy has opened its capital account. Therefore, a dynamic
framework is needed to give a full account of financial fragility in a developing
economy opened to international finance.
Such a framework has first been developed by Schneider & Tornell (2004)
in the case of boom-bust cycles. They model a dynamic economy with a
finite number of periods where a credit boom is induced by an expected
future increase in the demand for non-tradable goods. If the boom is large
enough, it can make self-fulfilling crises possible. Their crisis mechanism
relies on borrowing constraints and currency mismatches.
In this paper, we follow the same strategy and extend their framework in
several directions:
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• We build an overlapping generation model with an infinite number of
periods and study financial fragility in steady state equilibrium paths.
We are thus able to assess the long-run effect of capital account lib-
eralization, independently of boom-bust cycles induced by transitory
shocks.1
• We explicitly introduce two input-producing sectors: tradable and non-
tradable, which we model in an entirely symmetric way. Any difference
between the two sectors is an endogenous outcome of the model. The
relative size of these two sectors plays a key role in our analysis.
• We use weaker technological assumptions: production functions are
concave and the desired level of investment is a well-defined function.
As a result, borrowing constraints need not bind in the equilibrium.
We show that a within-period sunspot equilibrium is possible when the
debt repayments of firms producing non-tradable goods are high enough rela-
tive to their cash-flow and/or the sector producing non-tradable goods is large
enough relative to the sector producing tradable goods. Financial fragility
thus depends on both financial and real factors: the firm-level financial struc-
ture within the non-tradable sector and the cross-sectorial productive struc-
ture. Both of these characteristics evolve along equilibrium paths. The dy-
namic part of the model allows us to determine whether their evolution in-
evitably leads to a situation of financial fragility. We find that this is the case
for sufficiently low levels of international interest rates, a sufficient degree of
financial openness and sufficiently high growth rates.
The precise mechanism underlying the existence of multiple equilibria in-
volves a self-reinforcing link between the real exchange rate and the level of
investment expenditures. First, because of moral hazard and imperfect moni-
toring of loans, firms are subject to a borrowing constraint. The amount they
1Based on empirical evidence, Kaminsky & Schmukler (2003) argue that the large
amplitude of boom-bust cycles in the stock market following financial liberalization might
be a transitory phenomenon and disappear in the long run.
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are able to borrow is limited by their cash-flows, which yields a financial accel-
erator effect. Second, the economy is subject to original sin and firms cannot
contract debt in domestic currency, which generates a currency mismatch in
the balance sheets of firms producing non-tradable goods. Together, these
two market imperfections create a balance sheet effect in the non-tradable
sector, whereby movements in the real exchange rate affect firm’s balance
sheets, their capacity to raise external funds and their level of investment.
Third, investment partly consists of expenditures in non-tradable goods so
that an increase in investment provokes a real appreciation. Thus, a real
appreciation increases the cash-flow of non-tradable firms and loosens their
borrowing constraint so that they can invest more; the higher level of invest-
ment reinforces the real appreciation until the borrowing constraint does not
bind any more. On the contrary, a real depreciation has a negative impact
on their balance sheets, which limits the investment expenditures they can
finance and further depreciates the real exchange rate until the non-tradable
firms eventually default on their loans. To be possible, this reinforcing mech-
anism requires a sufficiently strong financial accelerator effect.
The stylized facts reproduced by the model are qualitatively consistent
with the empirical evidence that has been documented in several papers. Our
model predicts that an increase in the relative size of the non-tradable sector
with regards to the tradable sector is one of the key factors inducing finan-
cial fragility. Tornell & Westermann (2002) indeed observe an asymmetrical
evolution of the two sectors in an event study of twin crises: the relative
size of the non-tradable sector increases before the crises and decreases af-
ter. According to our model, an increase in this relative size should go along
with a real appreciation. A real appreciation is indeed observed in the phase
of high growth preceding a crisis (Kaminsky & Reinhart 1999, Gourinchas,
Valde´s & Landerretche 2001, Tornell & Westermann 2002). The model also
emphasizes the central role played by investment in the crisis mechanism.
This is consistent with the fact that investment is the component of GDP
displaying the largest variability in the crisis episodes, growing rapidly be-
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fore and falling abruptly during the crisis (Gourinchas et al. 2001, Tornell &
Westermann 2002). At last, the crises are often sudden, a fact accounted for
by our multiple equilibria story.
There are other papers trying to model the instability of emerging mar-
ket countries. Jeanne & Zettelmeyer (2002) propose a simple and unified
framework that encompasses both Krugman’s credit crunch model and other
balance sheet approaches based on maturity mismatches and bank runs.
Rancie`re, Tornell & Westermann (2003) develop a growth model where
self-fulfilling crises are possible in the long run. This work differs from ours in
the modeling details. In their setting, the tradable sector has a standard pro-
duction function with constant returns to scale and no borrowing constraint
whereas the non-tradable sector has increasing returns and is subject to a
borrowing constraint.2 In our work, both sectors are treated symmetrically
and any difference between them endogenously arise as a result of the model.
Also, the crisis mechanism they use is different from ours.
Aghion, Bacchetta & Banerjee (2004a) construct a dynamic monetary
model with multiple equilibria where a self-fulfilling crisis is possible in the
first period if the subsequent productivity is sufficiently large. Therefore,
their paper do not address the issue of long-run financial fragility. In another
paper (2004b), the same authors develop a model of financial instability where
endogenous cycles arise in the long run because of a balance sheet effect.
They have the same perspective as the one we follow in this paper, in that
they seek to determine the structural conditions of this cyclical instability
but there are no crisis in their model and they do not discuss the effect of
changes in the sectorial structure.
In previous works (Kalantzis 2004, 2005), we have constructed a dynamic
two-sector growth model where self-fulfilling crises could occur in the long-
2Contrary to the assumption made by these authors, it seems to us more natural, if
one wants to treat the two sectors in an asymmetrical way, to assume increasing returns
in the tradable sector alone. Increasing returns are indeed more likely to be observed in
industrial sectors than in construction and services. See van Wijnbergen (1984) for an
two-sector open-economy model with learning-by-doing in the tradable sector.
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run. The dynamic part of that model relied on increasing returns and the
crisis mechanism involved a myopic investment behavior of entrepreneurs
whereas the present model has concave production functions and rational
expectations.
Our work is also related to financial accelerator models in closed economies
and the literature on borrowing constraints (Bernanke & Gertler 1989, Kiy-
otaki & Moore 1997, Holmstrom & Tirole 1996, Holmstrom & Tirole 1998),
as well as to the literature on original sin (Eichengreen & Hausmann 1999,
Eichengreen, Hausmann & Panizza 2003c).
The paper is organized as follows. We present the model in section 1. In
section 2, we solve the within-period equilibrium and show that a sunspot
equilibrium may exist. In section 3, we study the steady state of the dynamics
and show to what condition it displays financial fragility. We calibrate the
model in section 4 with data from Argentina in the nineties. In section 5, we
examine the effects of different unexpected shocks and relate them with the
condition of long-run financial fragility. Section 6 concludes.
1 The model
We consider a small open economy with overlapping generations. There
are five kinds of agents: households, firms producing a final good for con-
sumption, entrepreneurs producing tradable or non-tradable inputs and deep-
pocket external investors. Time is discrete. Agents live two periods. There
is one source of uncertainty: at each period, a sunspot variable St takes the
value 1 with probability ω and 0 with probability 1−ω (ω < 1). When there
are multiple equilibria, St = 0 will correspond to crisis times.
Financial openness
There is an international financial market with deep-pocket and risk-neutral
external investors where one-period bonds are traded with an international
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riskless interest rate R∗ (in terms of tradable goods). Due to the small
economy assumption, R∗ is exogenous.
We assume that all agents in the economy have access to this market.
However, there is an iceberg cost τ ≥ 0 to international financial transactions.
When an international investor lends 1 + τ units of tradable goods to a
domestic agent, the domestic agent only gets 1 unit, and vice versa. As
international investors are risk-neutral, the international riskless rate faced
by a domestic agent borrowing abroad is RD = (1 + τ)R∗. Likewise, the
international rate faced by a domestic agent lending abroad is R∗/(1 + τ).
τ is a measure of financial openness. The case τ = 0 corresponds to an
economy entirely opened to international finance.
The households
Households live two periods. They are endowed with one unit of labor in
their first period of life and they consume final goods. Lt is the number of
households born at time t. We assume a constant population Lt = L.
Denote cyt the consumption level of a young household born at time t and
cot+1 the consumption level of the same household at time t+ 1. Preferences
are logarithmic:
U = log (cyt ) + βEt
[
log
(
cot+1
)]
(1)
where β ∈]0, 1[ is a discount factor and Et[·] denotes the expected value at
time t.
To transfer consumption from their first to their second period of life,
households can buy three different kinds of assets: they can buy bonds on the
international market or they can lend funds to the domestic entrepreneurs of
either the tradable or the non-tradable sector. They choose the total amount
of savings and the composition of their portfolio to maximize intertemporal
utility subject to their budget constraint. We will solve this maximization
program later, with the help of a simplifying assumption.
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The final good sector
At time t, the final good Ct is produced by a competitive sector using labor
Lt = L and two types of intermediate goods: tradable inputs T
C
t and non-
tradable inputs NCt . The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function
with constant returns to scale:
Ct =
[
(NCt )
µ(TCt )
1−µ]α L1−α (2)
with α, µ ∈]0, 1[. Profit maximization by firms give the usual first order
conditions. Respectively denoting pt, p
C
t and wt the price of the non-tradable
input, the price of the consumption good and the wage, all of them in terms
of tradable goods, one gets:
(1− α)pCt Ct = wtL (3)
αµpCt Ct = ptN
C
t (4)
α(1− µ)pCt Ct = TCt (5)
Remark that p is a measure of the real exchange rate (a high value of p
corresponds to an appreciated real exchange rate).
The intermediate sectors
There are two kinds of intermediate goods: tradable and non-tradable. The
tradable input is produced by the tradable sector (sector T) but can also be
imported. Likewise, any excess production of this sector can be exported. We
assume that the international demand for tradable inputs is infinitely elastic.
The non-tradable input is exclusively produced by a domestic non-tradable
sector (sector N) and the whole production has to be used domestically.
Each sector is composed by a continuum of firms of measure one. Each
firm produces an intermediate good using the two kinds of inputs as capi-
tal. A firm of the sector N produces at time t + 1 a quantity Nt+1 of non-
tradable intermediate goods using a capital of KNt tradable goods and J
N
t
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non-tradable goods.3 The production function is a Cobb-Douglas function
with diminishing returns:
Nt+1 = A
N
t+1
[(
KNt
1− η
)1−η (
JNt
η
)η]δ
(6)
with η, δ ∈]0, 1[. Both types of capital are fully depreciated from one period
to the next.
Likewise, the production function for a firm of the sector T is:
Tt+1 = A
T
t+1
[(
KTt
1− η
)1−η (
JTt
η
)η]δ
(7)
There is an exogenous and homogenous growth trend in the productivity of
both sectors:
Ait = A
i
0
[
(1 + g)1−δ
]t
i = N, T (8)
In the following, g will be the steady-state growth rate of the economy.
Each firm in the intermediate sectors is run by successive generations
of risk-neutral entrepreneurs. We assume that they do not consume during
their first period of life and that they spend some fixed fraction γ ∈]0, 1[
of their profits to consume final goods in their second period of life. Thus,
an entrepreneur of the sector i born at time t invests her internal funds W it
in the first period of life, gets the return Πit+1 in the second period of life,
keeps a fraction γ for her own consumption and gives the remaining pro-
ceeds W it+1 = (1 − γ)Πit+1 to her successor. Moreover, at time t, a young
entrepreneur can borrow some additional external funds to domestic house-
holds or international lenders and pay them back in the following period.
The market for corporate debt
We now introduce two market imperfections. First, we assume that the
economy is subject to the so-called original sin: there is no market for debt
3KNt mainly consists of machinery, transportation, . . . . J
N
t represents buildings but
also all possible non-tradable goods and services necessary to the installation of tradable
capital.
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denominated in non-tradable goods.4 Therefore, the entrepreneurs can only
issue debt denominated in tradable goods. In particular, entrepreneurs pro-
ducing non-tradable goods cannot insure against real exchange rate risk.5
Second, because of moral hazard and imperfect monitoring, an entrepreneur
might be subject to a borrowing constraint. We follow Schneider & Tornell
(2004) and Aghion, Banerjee & Piketty (1999) for the detailed microfounda-
tion of this borrowing constraint.
Let
Bit+1
Rit
denote the external funds lent to an entrepreneur of the sector
i at time t. The entrepreneur has to repay at time t + 1 an amount Bit+1 in
tradable goods. Rit may include a risk premium due to possible defaults. As
in Schneider & Tornell (2004), the entrepreneur has the possibility, at time
t+1, if the firm is solvent (cf infra), to run away with the production without
repaying its debt Bit+1. This, however, requires some special effort and costs
her a disutility d
[
W it +
Bit+1
Rit
]
proportional to the total funds of the firm. If
she chooses to do this, the lender can try to find her and force her to repay
her debt. He can choose the probability of success m, which can be thought
of as the intensity of monitoring. But, as in Aghion et al. (1999), monitoring
also requires some effort and cost him a disutility C(m)
Bit+1
Rit
proportional
to the size of the loan, C(·) being an increasing function. Therefore, if the
entrepreneur has disappeared at the beginning of the period t+1, the lender
4See Eichengreen et al. (2003c) for an empirical investigation on the relevance of this
concept. According to Eichengreen, Hausmann & Panizza (2003b), original sin might be
the result of transaction costs in international finance which set a finite number of curren-
cies in the world’s portfolio: the cost to detain the marginal currency should compensate
the benefit derived from risk diversification. As large countries offer more diversification
than small ones, they argue that one should expect the currencies of large countries to be
dominant in international portfolios.
5Several authors have proposed arguments to explain why domestic firms choose to take
a risky position by issuing debt denominated in foreign currency: moral hazard induced
by expected bail-outs (Schneider & Tornell 2004), borrowing constraints in the domestic
financial system (Caballero & Krishnamurthy 2000), commitment problems (Jeanne 2000)
or the lack of credibility of the domestic monetary policy (Jeanne 2003). In this paper, we
consider that firms could not issue domestic currency debt, even if they wanted to. For a
more detailed discussion on the difference between original sin and currency mismatches,
refer to Eichengreen, Hausmann & Panizza (2003a).
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will choose the intensity of monitoring mt+1 to maximize his expected utility
mt+1B
i
t+1 − C(mt+1)
Bit+1
Rit
. The solution m∗t+1 of this maximization program
is given by the first order condition:
C ′(m∗t+1) = R
i
t
This is anticipated by the entrepreneur who decides not to run away if the
disutility from running away is higher than the debt repayment:
d
(
W it +
Bit+1
Rit
)
+m∗t+1B
i
t+1 ≥ Bit+1
This is in turn anticipated by the lender at period t. As he prefers to be fully
repaid, he lends the greatest possible amount satisfying the previous inequal-
ity. This sets an upper limit on borrowing, depending of the entrepreneur’s
internal funds:
Bit+1 ≤
d
1−m∗t+1 − dRit
W it (9)
Following Aghion et al. (1999), we now choose a particular functional
form for the monitoring cost: C(m) = −c log(1 − m). We also make the
following assumption to ensure the existence of a borrowing constraint:
Assumption 1 (borrowing constraint).
d < c
Then, m∗t+1 = 1−
c
Rit
and equation (9) can be simplified to:6
Bit+1
Rit
≤ W
i
t
c
d
− 1 (10)
d
c
can be thought of as an indicator of the level of financial development of
the economy. A high value of this ratio implies that it is difficult for the
entrepreneurs to cheat and easy for the lenders to monitor their loans.
6The functional form we have chosen for C(m) gives a credit multiplier independent of
the interest rate. This is a special case whose only purpose is analytical tractability.
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Defaults
If the firm is not solvent, the entrepreneur cannot repay the debt in her
second period of life: she defaults and does not get anything for her own
consumption (Πit = 0). We assume that the entire production is then wasted
as a bankruptcy cost, so that the lenders do not get anything either.7 The
next entrepreneur does not get anything from the incumbent one. We assume
that she gets some exogenous endowment Zt in tradable goods and has no
access to the financial market. This conditional endowment grows at the rate
g: Zt+1 = (1 + g)Zt.
Entrepreneurs of the sector T know their future profits with certainty and
invest at most up to the point where the marginal productivity of investment
is equal to the interest rate. Therefore, they will always have positive profits
and never default. On the contrary, firms of the sector N produce non-
tradable goods and are indebted in tradable goods, so that they default
when the real exchange rate is sufficiently depreciated. The proceeds from
their sales at time t is strictly lower than their debt repayment when pt < p
D
t ,
with:
pDt =
BNt
Nt
(11)
We can now write the profits earned by entrepreneurs of both sectors
ΠTt = Tt −BTt (12)
ΠNt =
ptNt −BNt if pt ≥ pDt0 if pt < pDt (13)
and the internal funds of entrepreneurs:
W Tt = (1− γ)ΠTt (14)
WNt =
(1− γ)ΠNt if pt ≥ pDtZt if pt < pDt (15)
7This assumption is not necessary to our results but yields a simple expression for the
risk premium.
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We will later construct a sunspot equilibrium where N firms default when
the sunspot variable takes the value St = 0 and make positive profits when
St = 1. Denote Ft a dichotomic variable equal to 0 when there can never be
any default, whatever the value taken by the sunspot, and to 1 when St = 0
provokes defaults in the non-tradable sector. Ft is an indicator of financial
fragility. The probability that an entrepreneur producing non-tradable inputs
gets a positive return and repays its debt at time t is equal to:
ρt = 1− (1− ω)Ft (16)
The probability of default in the non-tradable sector is of course 1 − ρt =
(1− ω)Ft.
The investment decision
An entrepreneur of the sector N who inherited internal fundsWNt = (1−γ)ΠNt
decides at time t how much to borrow and invest by maximizing the profits
of the next period. As she will not get anything if the firm defaults at time
t + 1, she solves the following maximization program in the case there is no
default at time t+ 1:
max
KNt , J
N
t , I
N
t , B
N
t+1
Et
[
pt+1|pt+1≥pDt+1
]
Nt+1 −BNt+1 (17)
s. t. Nt+1 = A
N
t+1
[(
KNt
1−η
)1−η (
JNt
η
)η]δ
INt = K
N
t + ptJ
N
t
INt =
BNt+1
RNt
+WNt
BNt+1
RNt
≤ W itc
d
−1
Et
[
pt+1|pt+1≥pDt+1
]
is the expectation at time t of pt+1 supposing that there
is no default at time t+ 1. INt is the investment expenditure at time t. The
four constraints are the production function, the definition of the investment
expenditure, the budget constraint and the borrowing constraint. Of course,
BNt+1 could be negative, in which case R
N
t would be the rate of return on the
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internal funds not invested in production, but we will only study situations
where BNt+1 ≥ 0 (see assumption 4 infra).
Two cases are possible. If the borrowing constraint does not bind, one
has INt = I¯
N
t , with
I¯Nt =
(
δEt
[
pt+1|pt+1≥pDt+1
]
ANt+1
pηδt R
N
t
) 1
1−δ
(18)
If, on the contrary, the borrowing constraint does bind, the investment ex-
penditure is limited by the internal funds:
INt =
1
1− d
c
WNt (19)
This is a financial accelerator effect. Denote λ = 1
1− d
c
the intensity of this
financial accelerator. It increases with the level of financial development d
c
.
From assumption 1, it is strictly greater than 1. Summing up both cases,
one ends up with:
INt = min(I¯
N
t , λW
N
t ) (20)
Denote pBt the value of the relative price pt for which I¯
N
t = λW
N
t . The
borrowing constraint binds for pt < p
B
t , i.e. when the real exchange rate is
sufficiently depreciated.
In both cases, one gets:
KNt = (1− η)INt (21)
ptJ
N
t = ηI
N
t (22)
Nt+1 = p
−ηδ
t A
N
t+1
(
INt
)δ
(23)
BNt+1
RNt
= INt −WNt (24)
If the incumbent manager has defaulted, the young entrepreneurs start
with the exogenous endowment Zt and has no access to financial markets. In
that case, equation (20) has to be replaced by: INt = min(I¯
N
t , Zt). We sup-
pose that Zt is low enough so that, on the whole, the investment expenditure
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in the sector N is given by:
INt =

I¯Nt if pt ≥ pBt
λWNt if p
D
t ≤ pt < pBt
Zt if pt < p
D
t
(25)
The entrepreneur of the tradable sector faces a similar problem, except
that the return on investment in tradable goods is certain, as both the debt
repayment and the sales are tradable goods:
I¯Tt =
(
δATt+1
pηδt R
T
t
) 1
1−δ
(26)
ITt = min(I¯
T
t , λW
T
t ) (27)
KTt = (1− η)ITt (28)
ptJ
T
t = ηI
T
t (29)
Tt+1 = p
−ηδ
t A
T
t+1
(
ITt
)δ
(30)
BTt+1
RTt
= ITt −W Tt (31)
The “emerging market country” assumption
An emerging market country is a country where international capital is flow-
ing into, after the capital account is liberalized. In technical terms, domestic
savings are lower than domestic investment in an emerging country or, equiv-
alently, the autarky interest rate (the rate of interest that would equalize sup-
ply and demand of loanable funds if the economy were closed to international
finance) is higher than the international interest rate.
For analytical convenience, we make here a slightly more restrictive as-
sumption: we assume that, at any period t, total savings from households Σt
are lower than the demand for loanable funds from the tradable sector alone
BTt+1
RTt
.
This assumption allows us to determine the composition of the represen-
tative household’s portfolio and the equilibrium interest rates. First, even
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if the household only invests in the tradable sector, the entrepreneurs from
this sector will have to borrow some of their external funds abroad. There-
fore, in any case, the interest rate RTt is set by the international risk-neutral
investors:
RTt = (1 + τ)R
∗ = RD (32)
As a domestic bond issued by an entrepreneur of the sector T gives a
higher return to the household than a bond bought on the international
market
(
(1+ τ)R∗ ≥ R∗/(1+ τ)), the household portfolio will be exclusively
composed of domestic assets.
Second, as the household is risk-averse, it will not hold a risky bond issued
by the non-tradable sector unless there is a strictly positive risk premium
over the interest rate charged by risk-neutral investors. Therefore, when
the probability of a default in the next period is expected to be strictly
positive, entrepreneurs from the non-tradable sector will borrow all their
external funds abroad and the household’s portfolio will only consist of bonds
issued by the tradable sector. The interest rate charged to the non-tradable
sector can then be deduced from the risk-neutrality of international investors:
RNt = (1 + τ)
R∗
Et[ρt+1]
=
RD
Et[ρt+1]
(33)
We can now go back to the household’s maximization program. A house-
hold born at time t saves by lending funds to the tradable sector (and to
the non-tradable sector if Et[ρt+1] = 1) with a riskless rate of return R
D in
terms of tradable goods. Note however that, because of the uncertainty on
the future consumption price, the return in terms of consumption goods is
also uncertain.
The Euler equation derived from the maximization program is:
1
cyt
= βEt
[
RDpCt
cot+1p
C
t+1
]
(34)
By using the budget constraint pCt+1c
o
t+1 = R
D(wt−pCt cyt ), it can be simplified
to:
1
cyt
=
βpCt
wt − pCt cyt
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which yields the usual saving equation:
Σt
L
= wt − pCt cyt =
β
1 + β
wt (35)
s =
β
1 + β
is the saving rate of young households.
We can now give a more precise formulation of our “emerging market
country” assumption:
Assumption 2 (emerging market country). The discount factor β is
sufficiently small so that, at any time period t, one has:
Σt ≤ B
T
t+1
RD
2 Within-period equilibrium
In this section, we take the past variable wt−1, the predetermined variables
Nt, Tt, B
N
t , B
T
t and the expected variables Et[pt+1|pt+1 ≥ pDt+1] and RNt =
(1 + τ) R
∗
Et[ρt+1]
as given and determine the temporary equilibrium at time t.
The demand for non-tradable inputs stems from both the final sector and
the investment expenditures from the intermediate sectors: Nt = N
C
t +J
N
t +
JTt . From equations (4), (22) and (29), one gets:
ptNt = αµp
C
t Ct + η
(
ITt + I
N
t
)
(36)
The demand for final goods itself stems from young and old workers and old
entrepreneurs of both sectors:
pCt Ct = (1− s)wtL+RDswt−1L+ γ
(
ΠTt +Π
N
t
)
Using equation (3), we can now write the reduced equation of the non-
tradable market equilibrium:
ptNt =
µ
1 + s1−α
α
[
γ
(
ΠTt +Π
N
t
)
+RDΣt−1
]
+ η
(
ITt + I
N
t
)
(37)
where Σt−1 = swt−1L.
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Together with equations (12), (13) and (27), this equation yields a first
relationship between the investment expenditure INt and the real exchange
rate pt, represented by the NN schedule on figure 1. Denote I
N
t = fNN(pt)
the equation of this first schedule. A second relationship between those two
variables comes from the investment behavior of the N firms described by
equation (25) and represented by the II schedule on figure 1. Denote INt =
fII(pt) the equation of this second schedule.
pLt
Zt
INt
NN
II
ptp
H
tp
B
tp
D
t
Figure 1: Within-period multiple equilibria
To compute the within-period equilibrium, we only have to determine the
couple (pt, I
N
t ) as an intersection of the NN and II schedules. Once (pt, I
N
t )
is known, the within-period equilibrium values of all the other variables are
easily determined : ITt is given by equation (27); equation (36) gives the total
value pCt Ct of produced final goods, which, plugged into equation (3), yields
the wage wt. Equations (2), (3), (4) and (5) implicitly determine the price
of the final good pCt as a function of pt and wt, from which the quantity Ct
of final goods can be deduced.
We now focus on the determination of pt and I
N
t . The II schedule is
composed of three distinctive parts (see figure 1). For pt < p
D
t , the N firms
default. The new cohort of managers starts with the exogenous endowment
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Zt and has no access to the financial market: therefore, I
N
t = Zt on that
interval. For pDt ≤ pt < pBt , the N firms have insufficient internal funds and
face a borrowing constraint. INt is linearly increasing with pt on that interval.
For pt ≥ pBt , the internal funds of N firms are sufficiently high so that the
borrowing constraint does not bind. They borrow less than the maximum
amount possible and invest the optimal quantity I¯Nt . I
N
t is decreasing with
pt on that interval.
As it can be seen from figure 1, it is possible that the II and the NN sched-
ules intersect three times, with one intersection on each of these three inter-
vals, thus yielding multiple equilibria. The equilibrium located in the interval
[pDt , p
B
t ] is then unstable (in the sense of implicit virtual out-of-equilibrium
dynamics corresponding to the walrasian auctioneer’s tatonnement) and we
are left with two stable equilibria:
• a “good” equilibrium corresponding to tranquil times with an appreci-
ated real exchange rate pHt , where the N firms have high internal funds
and are not constrained,
• a “bad” equilibrium corresponding to crisis times with a depreciated
real exchange rate pLt , where the N firms default on their loans.
This framework allows us to construct a crisis event as a transition from
the good equilibrium pHt to the bad equilibrium p
L
t+1. The crisis manifests
itself by a real depreciation, widespread defaults on external debt in the non-
tradable sector and losses from external lenders. In this sense, it is a balance
of payments crisis.
For this to happen, the slope of the II schedule has to be steeper than
the slope of the NN schedule at their point of intersection on the interval
[pDt , p
B
t ]. A necessary condition for this is that:
µγ
1 + s1−α
α
+ η(1− γ)λ > 1 (38)
Therefore, the intensity of the financial accelerator effect λ has to be large
enough for crises to be possible. As this coefficient increases with the level
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of financial development, this means that the domestic financial system has
to be sufficiently developed. The kind of crisis we are describing would not
happen in an economy subject to financial repression.8
When there are multiple equilibria, we can construct a sunspot equilib-
rium where the agents use the sunspot variable St as a coordination device
to choose between the “good” and the “bad” equilibrium. We say the econ-
omy is financially fragile when such a sunspot equilibrium exists, i.e. when
both a good equilibrium with unbinding borrowing constraints and a bad
equilibrium with defaults in the sector N exist at the same time. We suppose
that this sunspot equilibrium is actually implemented whenever it is possible.
The variable Ft defined above is equal to 1 when the economy is financially
fragile and to 0 when it is not. The international lenders take into account
the possibility of crisis by anticipating one period in advance the value of the
variable Ft+1 and incorporating it in the interest rate R
N
t (see equation (33)).
This short discussion is formalized by the following proposition:
Proposition 1. When µγ
1+s 1−α
α
+ η(1− γ)λ ≤ 1, there cannot be at the same
time an equilibrium characterized by pt = p
L
t < p
D
t and an equilibrium with
pt ≥ pDt .
When µ
1+s 1−α
α
γ+ η(1− γ)λ > 1, if fNN(pDt ) > Zt and (fNN− fII)(pBt ) < 0,
there is a sunspot equilibrium where pt = p
H
t > p
B
t with probability ω (when
St = 1) and pt = p
L
t < p
D
t with probability 1− ω (when St = 0).
Proof. See Appendix A.1.
When there is no financial fragility (Ft = 0), there is no uncertainty in
the sector N so that profits have to be positive in that sector. Therefore, the
equilibrium real exchange rate has to satisfy pt ≥ pDt . We also denote pHt
this equilibrium with no default.9
The crucial condition for a crisis to be possible is of course fNN(p
D
t ) > Zt,
which states the existence of the bad equilibrium. Using the fact that ITt ≤
8This is a usual result of the literature on balance sheets and financial crises. See for
example Aghion, Bacchetta & Banerjee (2004b) and Schneider & Tornell (2004).
9Remark that if the inequality (38) is not satisfied, the borrowing constraint may bind
for the sector N in this equilibrium.
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λ(1− γ)ΠTt , we derive a sufficient condition for this existence:
BNt
ΠTt
>
µ
1 + s1−α
α
[
γ +
RDΣt−1
ΠTt
]
+ η(1− γ)λ+ ηZt
ΠTt
(39)
This condition states that the bad equilibrium exists whenever the debt
repayment of the sector N is large enough compared to the profits of the
sector T. The corresponding threshold is increasing with the intensity of the
financial accelerator effect λ and the amount of past savings from households.
In tranquil times, the ratio
BNt
ΠTt
can be decomposed in the following way:
BNt
ΠTt
=
BNt
ΠNt
WNt
W Tt
The first ratio relates debt service to cash-flow and captures the financial
structure of N firms’ balance sheets. The second one describes the relative
size of both sectors and is an indicator of the productive structure of the
whole economy. Thus, highly leveraged N firms and/or a productive struc-
ture largely oriented toward the production of non tradable goods are con-
ditions that favor the possibility of crises. Those two quantities, which are
predetermined in the within-period equilibrium, endogenously evolve with
the model dynamics.
3 Financial fragility in the long run
We now study the dynamics of the model. We define an equilibrium path as
a succession of within-period equilibria with rational expectations:
Et[pt+1|pt+1 ≥ pDt+1] = pHt+1 (40)
Et[ρt+1] = ρt+1 = 1− (1− ω)Ft+1 (41)
Remark that the good equilibrium has to exist at every period along an
equilibrium path.10
10Suppose there is only a bad equilibrium at time t so that all N firms default. On an
equilibrium path, entrepreneurs with rational expectations should have anticipated it at
time t−1 and decided to put their internal funds in bonds issued by the sector T or in the
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Our aim is to investigate whether such an equilibrium path may run
through a crisis, i.e. whether there is a period t such that Ft = 1 and
St = 0. Our strategy is to study the steady state of a particular equilibrium
path where St happened to be always equal to 1 and therefore pt always
equal to pHt . If this steady state is financially fragile, then every possible
equilibrium path becomes financially fragile for a large enough t and the
economy eventually runs through a crisis with probability 1. In doing this,
we assess the possibility of crises in the long run, independently of any shock
that might trigger transitory dynamics.
From now on, we suppose that the inequality (38) is satisfied so that our
economy may be subject to financial fragility.
Assumption 3 (necessary condition for financial fragility).
µγ
1 + s1−α
α
+ η(1− γ)λ > 1
Let us consider the steady state of a particular equilibrium path where
St has not taken the value 0 yet, so that the economy has always been in the
good equilibrium where the borrowing constraint does not bind for the sector
N. In this steady state, all quantity variables grow at the rate g. Ratios of
quantities are therefore constant, and so are prices and interest rates. We
drop the time subscript of these constant steady-state variables.
The non-tradable sector
Equation (18) can be rewritten: RNt I¯
N
t = δp
H
t+1Nt+1. This, together with
equations (14), (13) and (24), allows us to write:
IN
WN
=
(1 + g)INt
(1− γ)[pHt+1Nt+1 −BNt+1]
=
(1 + g)INt
(1− γ)
[
RN I¯Nt
δ
−RN(I¯Nt −WNt )
]
=
1 + g
(1− γ)
[
RN(1/δ − 1) +RN WN
IN
]
international financial market where they get the riskless rate R∗/(1 + τ). Had they done
so, there would not be any N good produced at time t and the price pt would be infinite,
which is not consistent with a default.
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which can be reduced to
IN
WN
=
δ
1− δ (ρφ− 1) (42)
where φ is an exogenous reduced variable defined by
φ =
1 + g
R∗(1 + τ)(1− γ) (43)
φ increases with financial openness (i.e. decreases with τ), technological
progress (g), the amount of international liquidity (i.e. decreases with R∗)
and captures part of the generational structure (the parameter γ).
Likewise, we can compute the steady-state debt-to-internal funds ratio:
BN
WN
=
1
1− γ
δ
1− δ
(
1− 1
δρφ
)
(44)
We make the following assumption to ensure that the debt of the sector
N is strictly positive in the steady state:11
Assumption 4 (positive steady-state debt).
φ >
1
δ
This assumption also ensures that the steady-state value of I
N
WN
is positive.
So far, we have computed these ratios by assuming that the good equi-
librium exists in the steady-state. From proposition 1, however, this requires
that (fNN− fII)(pBt ) < 0. This condition is satisfied in the steady state when
the ratio I
N
WN
given by equation (42) is strictly lower than λ, so that the
borrowing constraint does not bind for N firms in the computed equilibrium.
Therefore, we have to assume that:
11 From equation (44), the debt of the sector N is positive when φ ≥ 1δρ . Suppose
1
δ ≤ φ ≤ 1δρ . It is not possible to have ρ = ω < 1 in that case. Indeed, it would require
on the one hand that F = 1 and on the other hand imply a strictly negative steady state
debt for the sector N, which would not be consistent with financial fragility and F = 1.
Therefore, 1δ ≤ φ ≤ 1δρ ⇒ ρ = 1 and the condition for a strictly positive debt can be
reduced to the one stated in assumption 4.
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Assumption 5 (existence of a good equilibrium in the steady state).
φ <
1
ρ
δ + λ(1− δ)
δ
As we shall see, the economy is financially fragile for a large enough φ, so
that ρ is a function of φ. Therefore, this assumption implicitly restricts the
possible values taken by φ. Remark that assumptions 4 and 5 are consistent.
The tradable sector
Let us now turn to the sector T. If the borrowing constraint does not bind
for the sector T, the same calculations yield the following formulae:
IT
W T
=
δ
1− δ (φ− 1) (45)
BT
W T
=
1
1− γ
δ
1− δ
(
1− 1
δφ
)
(46)
From assumption 4, both quantities are strictly positive.
If, on the contrary, the borrowing constraint binds for the sector T, one
has of course:
IT
W T
= λ (47)
BT
W T
=
1
1− γ
1
φ
(λ− 1) (48)
By comparing equations (45) and (47), we can see that the borrowing
constraint binds for T firms if
δ + λ(1− δ)
δ
< φ
(
≤ 1
ρ
δ + λ(1− δ)
δ
)
. This
is only possible when ρ < 1, i.e. when F = 1 and there is financial fragility.
The productive structure
By using equations (3), (36) and (37), we can reformulate the non-tradable
market equilibrium in the steady state:
ptNt =
µγ
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
]W Tt +WNt
1− γ + η
(
ITt + I
N
t
)
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and compute the steady-state sectorial ratio of internal funds:
WN
W T
=
µγ
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] + η(1− γ) IT
W T
1
δρφ
IN
WN
− µγ
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] − η(1− γ) IN
WN
(49)
As we noticed earlier, this ratio characterizes the productive structure of the
economy. Other interesting ratios can be easily derived from that one. For
example:
IN
IT
=
IN/WN
IT/W T
WN
W T
(50)
N
T
=
AN
AT
(
IN
IT
)δ
(51)
Σ
W T
=
s1−α
α
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] γ
1− γ
(
1 +
WN
W T
)
(52)
When the borrowing constraint is not binding for the sector T, the steady-
state value of the real exchange rate pH is given by equations (18) and (26):
pH =
1
ρ
AT
AN
(
IN
IT
)1−δ
(53)
When it is binding, pH can be deduced from equation (18) alone.
Remark that the steady state only exists if the ratio W
N
WT
is positive.
This is the case whenever its denominator is positive. Denote Qρ(φ) the
denominator:
Qρ(φ) =
ρφ− 1
ρφ(1− δ) −
µγ
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] − η(1− γ)δ
1− δ (ρφ− 1)
Qρ(φ) has either 1 or 3 zeros. As Qρ goes to −∞ when φ >−→ 0 and
to +∞ when φ <−→ 1
(1−γ)[1+ αs(1−α) ]
, it has at least one zero in the interval]
0, 1
(1−γ)[1+ αs(1−α) ]
[
and at most two zeros in the interval
]
1
(1−γ)[1+ αs(1−α) ]
,+∞[.
Besides, Qρ(φ) is continuous on that interval and goes to −∞ when φ >−→
1
(1−γ)[1+ αs(1−α) ]
and φ→ +∞. Let us make the following assumption:
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Assumption 6.
s(1− α)
α
[
δ
1− γ − 1
]
<
1− µγ − η(1− γ)
1− η(1− γ)
This assumption is always satisfied when δ < 1 − γ. When not, it sets an
upper limit on the saving rate s = β
1+β
.
Under this assumption, 1
δ
is greater than 1
(1−γ)[1+ αs(1−α) ]
and Qρ(
1
δρ
) > 0.
Therefore, there is a unique φ˜(ρ) greater than 1
δρ
such that Qρ(φ˜) = 0. The
denominator is positive on the interval [ 1
δρ
, φ˜(ρ)[. As 1
δ
≤ φ ≤ 1
δρ
⇒ ρ = 1,12
the denominator is positive on the whole interval [1
δ
, φ˜(ρ)[.
Assumption 7 (existence of the steady-state).
φ < φ˜(ρ)
Financial fragility
From assumption 5, the existence of a good equilibrium is already ensured.
Therefore, our steady state is financially fragile if and only if the bad equi-
librium exists, i.e. if and only if fNN(p
D
t ) > Zt. In the steady state,
fNN(p
D
t ) =
1
η
[
BNt −
µγ ΠTt
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] − ηITt (pDt )
]
Using the fact that ITt (p
D
t ) ≤ λ(1− γ)ΠTt , we can write a sufficient condition
of financial fragility in the steady state:
BN
ΠT
>
µγ
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] + η(1− γ)λ+ ηZ
ΠT
(54)
This condition is the long-run equivalent of the inequality (39). As we
noticed in section 2:
BN
ΠT
= (1− γ) B
N
WN
WN
W T
Thus, the economy displays financial fragility in the long run when firms in
the non-tradable sectors are sufficiently leveraged or when the productive
structure is sufficiently oriented toward the non-tradable sector.
12See footnote 11.
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The following proposition shows that it is the case in the limit of a small
enough conditional endowment Z/ΠT and for some values of φ.
Proposition 2. If Z
ΠT
is small enough, ∃φ∗ ∈ ]1
δ
,min
(
φ˜(ω), 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)[
such
that the inequality (54) holds for all φ ∈ ]φ∗,min(φ˜(ω), 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)[
.
Furthermore, if Z
ΠT
is small enough, ∃ω∗ < 1, such that for all ω ∈]ω∗, 1],
∃φ∗ ∈ ]1
δ
,min
(
φ˜(ω), δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)[
such that the inequality (54) holds for all φ ∈]
φ∗,min
(
φ˜(ω), δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)[
.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
This proposition establishes that the steady state can always be finan-
cially fragile provided that the conditional endowment is small enough and
φ is large enough (though always within the limits set by assumptions 5 and
7). Thus, for these values of φ, a balance of payments crisis will occur at
some point in the future with probability 1. Looking back at the definition
of φ (equation (43)), we can see that the economy is likely to be subject to
financial fragility along an equilibrium path when:
1. it is very opened to international capital flows (the iceberg cost to
international transactions τ is small),
2. there is a large amount of international liquidity (the international in-
terest rate R∗ is low),
3. there is a high growth (coming from large productivity gains).13
In general, it is possible that φ∗ ≥ δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
. When this is the case, the
firms of the tradable sector are credit-constrained in any financially fragile
steady state. The second part of the proposition, however, shows that if the
probability ω is large enough, i.e. if the probability of default is sufficiently
small, the threshold value φ∗ can be strictly lower than δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
, so that a
steady state where T firms do not face a binding borrowing constraint can
13This confirms the result by Rancie`re et al. (2003) that there might be a trade-off
between high growth and recurrent financial crises, although in our framework the growth
rate of productivity g is not the result of a choice.
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also be financially fragile. Note that if φ∗ ≥ δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
, there might not be
an equilibrium path for all φ∗ ∈ [ δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
, φ∗
]
. Indeed, assumption 5 is not
satisfied on this interval when F = 0.14 This problem disappears when ω is
close enough to 1.
4 The effect of capital account liberalization
To give an illustration of this result, we calibrate the model using data from
Argentina in the nineties.15
The time period corresponds to the average duration of an investment
plan. We set it to 10 years.
We set α = 0.48, µ = 0.54, η = 0.63, γ = 0.3, δ = 0.8 and β = 0.05 16.
With this set of parameters, assumption 6 is satisfied and assumption 3 is
satisfied for λ > 1.92. We choose a conservative λ = 2. Finally, we set
ω = 0.99, so that financial fragility can occur for φ < δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
.
Figure 2 displays B
N
ΠT
as a function of φ for this set of parameters. The
14We write “might not be” because the inequality (54) is only a sufficient condition of
financial fragility and not a necessary one, so that the economy might be financially fragile
for φ ≤ φ∗ after all.
15This country has implemented a reform package between 1989 and 1991, including the
opening of the capital account. The economy has then experienced a decade of high growth
(interrupted by the “Tequila” crisis of 1995) until the recession of 1999 that culminated in
the collapse of 2001.
16The profit share α is given by the 1993 National Accounts (Maia & Nicholson 2001).
The share of non-tradables in consumption expenditures µ is directly given by the com-
position of the Consumer Price Index in 1999.
The price of the composite used as capital in the intermediate sector is pηt . We proxy
this price by the GDP price index and regress it (in logarithm) on price indices for goods,
construction and services. We use the sum of the coefficients of construction and services
as an estimate of η. The data come from the Ministerio de Economı´a (MECON) and the
Instituto Nacional de Estad´ıstica y Censos (INDEC) and cover the period 1993-2003.
γ = 0.3 seems a reasonable value. For the sake of comparison, the average retention
ratio for American firms is 60%, which yields γ = 0.4 (Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder
& Poterba 1988).
δ = 0.8 corresponds to a share of pure profit equal to 20% in the intermediate sector.
The same order in magnitude is used in another calibration exercise by Banerjee & Duflo
(2004).
β = 0.05 yields a saving rate of households s = 4.8% which accounts for the difference
between aggregate savings (data from the Penn World Table (2002) for 1990-1996) and
corporate savings (estimated for 1990-1996 by Bebczuk (2000)).
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for
α = 0.48, µ = 0.54, η = 0.63, γ = 0.3, δ = 0.8, β = 0.05, λ = 2, ω = 0.99 and Z
ΠT
→ 0.
The dotted line represents the threshold given by the inequality (54). The vertical line
corresponds to φ = δ+λ(1−δ)δ and divides the plan in a zone where the sector T is not
financially constrained (on the left) and a zone where it is (on the right).
Figure 2: Financial fragility in the long run
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steady state is financially fragile when B
N
ΠT
is greater than the threshold repre-
sented by the dotted line for ρ = ω.17 This happens for φ greater than 1.494,
which corresponds to an annual ratio (1 + g)/RD equal to 1.0045. For an
average annual growth rate of 4.79%,18 the model predicts that the economy
is financially fragile in the steady state when the annual riskless real interest
rate is lower than 4.32%. This figure is low but not unusual for periods with
large amounts of international liquidity and it seems plausible that Argentina
was financially fragile in the nineties, indeed. The average real interest rate
on external debt varied between 2.6 and 5.8% during the period 1990-199719
with an average of 4.32%.20 Moreover, as this rate includes a risk premium,
it is likely to overestimate the true value of the variable. In the following,
we choose the slightly lower value of 4.30%.21 Remark that this calibration
exercise is meant for illustratory purpose only and should be taken with pre-
cautions: because of the large duration of an investment plan (10 years), the
threshold of the financial fragility zone is very sensitive to the annual interest
and growth rates.
The value of B
N
ΠT
both reflects the steady state financial structure of the
firms producing non-tradable goods
(
BN
ΠN
)
and the productive structure of the
whole economy
(
WN
WT
)
. From equation (44), we know that the debt repayment
to cash-flow ratio B
N
ΠN
monotonically increases with φ. This manifests the fact
that the volume effect (firms contract more debt when the interest rate is low)
overrides the price effect (for the same volume of debt, the debt repayment
is lower when the interest rate is low). The way the productive structure
17The discontinuity in the curve corresponds to the change in the value of the financial
fragility indicator F .
18This is the average GDP growth rate of Argentina over the period 1991-1998, obtained
by regressing the logarithm of the GDP over a time trend (data from MECON).
19From 1998 on, real interest rates increase above 6%, partly as a result of the increase
in the emerging market risk premium that follows the Russian crisis. Section 5 studies the
effect of such an exogenous shock.
20The data on the nominal interest rate comes from the Institute of International Fi-
nance. We have deflated it by the US GDP price index given by the Bureau of Economic
Analysis.
21We check that, for the corresponding value of φ, assumption 2 is satisfied in the steady
state:
Σ
WT
is equal to 0.06 which is lower than
BT+1
RDWT
= 0.98.
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depends on φ is however ambiguous. On figure 3, we plot the relative size of
the two sectors W
N
WT
in the steady state as a function of φ.
1.45
1.5
1.55
1.6
1.65
1.7
1.75
1.25 1.3 1.35 1.4 1.45 1.5
W
N
W
T
φ
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
Note : This graph represents W
N
WT
as a function of φ on the interval
]
1
δ ,
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
[
for
α = 0.48, µ = 0.54, η = 0.63, γ = 0.3, δ = 0.8, β = 0.05, λ = 2, ω = 0.99 and Z
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→ 0.
The vertical line corresponds to φ = δ+λ(1−δ)δ and divides the plan in a zone where the
sector T is not financially constrained (on the left) and a zone where it is (on the right).
Figure 3: Productive structure in the long run
The resulting curve is U-shaped, decreasing for low enough value of φ
and increasing for higher φ. To get an intuitive interpretation of this shape,
it is useful to discuss the case of zero household savings (β = 0). In that
case, φ = 1
δ
corresponds to a closed economy where firms have zero debt
and finance all their investment expenditures by using their internal funds.
After a capital account liberalization, the interest rate decreases and φ in-
creases. When φ < µγ+η(1−γ)
η(1−γ) ,
WN
WT
is lower in the steady state than in the
closed economy. This roughly corresponds to the case of a negative financial
transfer:22 firms are repaying more to external lenders than what they receive
22Strictly speaking, the financial transfer from abroad is negative when φ < 1(1−γ) , i.e.
when 1 + g < RD. Since there are heterogenous agents in our model (the entrepreneurs
who repay the debt and consume are not the same as the ones who contract new debt
and invest), the limit µγ+η(1−γ)η(1−γ) takes into account the difference between the shares of
non-tradable in consumption and investment expenditures.
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from them. This induces a shift of resources from the non-tradable sector to
the tradable sector. On the contrary, φ ≥ µγ+η(1−γ)
η(1−γ) roughly corresponds to
the case of a positive financial transfer. The higher resources made available
to the country increase the level of consumption and investment expenditures
and the demand for both tradable and non-tradable inputs. The adjustment
comes from larger imports of tradable goods and a larger relative size of the
non-tradable sector.23 Therefore, if we think of emerging market economies
as receiving a positive financial transfer from abroad, we should expect them
to experience an increase in W
N
WT
as they open their capital account to inter-
national flows. It is not surprising, then, that an emerging market country
should be prone to self-fulfilling balance of payments crises.
Let us come back to our calibration exercise. For an annual growth rate
of 4.79% and an annual real interest rate of 4.30%, the model predicts that
WN
WT
is 11% higher than what it would be for φ = 1
δ
, which approximately
corresponds to a closed economy. From equations (50), (51) and (53), this
corresponds to a ratio p
HN
T
higher by 9%. This is rather well supported by
the empirical evidence. According to the available data,24 the relative size of
the non-tradable sector has increased by 8% between 1993 and 2000. Remark
that according to equations (50) and (53), the steady state real exchange rate
should also be higher than its “autarky” value, which is a well-established
stylized fact.
The effect of that shift in the productive structure towards non-tradable
goods is essential in explaining financial fragility. Would the ratio W
N
WT
remain
equal to the value it has when φ = 1
δ
(the “autarky” case), B
N
ΠT
would be equal
to 0.96, which is lower than the threshold 1.04. Thus, financial factors alone
are insufficient to account for financial fragility and the change in the sectorial
allocation of resources is a major mechanism at work in financial crises.25
23The mechanism described here is similar to the so-called“Dutch disease”phenomenon.
See Kalantzis (2004, 2005) for a model specifically relying on this effect.
24We use the ratio of sectorial GDP at 1993 prices for p
HN
T . N is defined as services and
construction. T is defined as manufacturing, agriculture and mining.
25This result is consistent with the empirical evidence presented by Tornell & Wester-
mann (2002). They observe that the size of the non-tradable sector increases with regards
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5 The effect of exogenous shocks
In section 3, we have shown that an equilibrium path eventually leads to a
crisis under certain conditions on the exogenous parameters of the model. In
particular, assumption 3 must hold, which means that the financial system
has to be sufficiently developed or, in other words, the borrowing constraint
has to be weak enough. Moreover, from proposition 2, the reduced variable
φ must be greater that some threshold. This implies, among other things, a
sufficiently low level of the international interest rate.
Those results were derived under the assumption that the parameters
have a constant value over the long run, so that the productive structure
of the economy
(
WN
WT
)
and the financial structure of the non-tradable sector(
BN
ΠN
)
have time to change. But we have said nothing about the short-run
effect of a change in these parameters, which is likely to be very different.
The empirical literature on emerging market crises indeed suggests that crises
are for example often associated with increases in the international interest
rate and with sudden stops, i.e. sudden increases in the intensity of the
borrowing constraint.
In this section, we briefly introduce different kinds of unexpected shocks in
the framework we have developed so far. We examine their short-run effect,
i.e whether they can trigger a crisis, and the relationship between this effect
and the conditions of financial fragility in the long run derived in section 3.
Suppose the economy is in the steady state studied in section 3 at time
t−1 and that St = 1, so that no crisis would occur at time t in the absence of
shocks. At time t, an unexpected shock hits one of the model’s parameters.
To make things simple, we assume the shock is known after agents have
formed their expectations of future prices, so that the expected relative price
is still equal to the steady state good equilibrium price: Et[pt+1|pt+1 ≥ pDt+1] =
pH , where pH is given by formula (53).
to the tradable sector in the few years preceding a twin crisis.
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(c) Unexpected negative shock on terms of trade
Figure 4: Crises triggered by unexpected shocks
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Sudden stops
We can model sudden stops in a rather crude way by assuming that firms
suddenly loose their access to finance due to an infinitely strong borrowing
constraint and have to entirely rely on their internal funds. Therefore, λ
unexpectedly takes the value 1. If the steady state was financially fragile
(Ft−1 = 1), the II and NN schedules do not intersect any more on the right
of pD (see figure 4, panel (a)), the good equilibrium ceases to exist and the
economy jumps to the bad equilibrium pL. On the contrary, if Ft−1 = 0,
the bad equilibrium does not exist. Two cases are possible, then. If the NN
schedule is far on the right so that it intersects the new II’ schedule in its
unconstrained part, the change in λ has no effect. If the NN schedule is not
so far on the right so that it intersects the new II’ schedule in its constrained
part, the economy jumps to an equilibrium where the borrowing constraint
binds for N firms. Because the inequality (38) is not satisfied anymore, this
equilibrium is now stable. The change of equilibrium then provokes a decrease
in INt and a real depreciation but firms do not default on their loans: the
sudden stop provokes a recession, but no crisis with widespread defaults and
losses for external lenders.
Therefore, a sudden stop provokes a crisis if and only if the economy
is financially fragile. The condition of long-run financial fragility derived
in section 3 is also a condition such that sudden stops lead to balance of
payments crises with defaults.
Shocks on R∗
Consider now the case of a positive shock on R∗. This increases the oppor-
tunity cost of investment in the intermediate sectors and therefore decreases
the unconstrained level of desired investment I¯Nt and I¯
T
t : the right part of
the II schedule moves down (and the unconstrained part of the NN schedule
moves up) and the price pB decreases to pB′t (figure 4, panel (b)). If p
B′
t
is lower than the price corresponding to the unstable equilibrium, the good
equilibrium no longer exists and the economy jumps to the bad equilibrium.
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First, a necessary condition for this to happen is of course that the bad
equilibrium exists, i.e. that the economy is financially fragile (Ft−1 = 1).
Second, for a shock on R∗ of a given size, the corresponding shift of the
II schedule is sufficient to make the good equilibrium disappear if pH is close
enough to pB, i.e. if the borrowing constraint is close enough to binding.
This happens when φ is close enough to its upper bound 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
.
Therefore, the model predicts that a positive shock on R∗ will be likely
to lead to a crisis if the value of R∗ prior to the shock was low enough, so
that φ was high enough.
Terms of trade shocks
We may model a negative shock on terms of trade as a decrease in the pro-
ductivity ATt of the sector T (with respect to an unchanged productivity of
sector N). The effect of this shock is to decrease the production of tradable
goods. Therefore, Πt and Wt decrease so that the NN schedule moves to the
left (figure 4, panel (c)). If the shock is large enough, the shift of the NN
schedule makes the good equilibrium disappear and the economy jumps to
the bad one, triggering a crisis.
As in the previous case, given the size of the shock, the good equilibrium
disappears if pH is close enough to pB. If not, it leads to a real depreciation
(pHt decreases) and to a higher investment in the non-tradable sector.
Therefore, here again, a negative shock on the terms of trade triggers a
crisis if φ is close enough to its upper bound 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
.
To sum it all up, a high enough value of φ does not only lead to financial
fragility in the long run, as we proved in section 3, but also makes the economy
sensitive to different kinds of shocks: adverse movements in the terms of
trade, sudden increases in the international interest rates or sudden stops.
All of these shocks trigger a crisis if the interest rate (before the shock) is
low enough and if the rate of technical progress and the financial openness
are high enough.
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6 Conclusion
We have built an overlapping generation model of financial fragility in a small
open economy. The production of the consumption good requires tradable
and non-tradable intermediate goods produced by two different sectors. In
both sectors, a continuum of firms led by entrepreneurs produces the inter-
mediate good with concave production functions.
Because capital is fixed one period in advance in the intermediate sec-
tors, production is predetermined in any given time period. Therefore, a
decrease in investment expenditures which diminishes both the demand for
tradable and non-tradable inputs has to be met by a decrease in imports
(an increase in net exports) and a decrease in the relative price of the non-
tradable good: a real depreciation. The real depreciation has a negative
effect on the balance sheets of firms producing non-tradable goods and limits
their investment capacity through a financial accelerator effect. This vali-
dates the initial decrease, up to the point where they cannot meet their debt
repayments and have to default on their loans. Our model therefore allows
for self-fulfilling balance of payments crises, where a sudden real depreciation
goes along with a sharp drop in investment and widespread defaults in the
non-tradable sector.
The balance sheet effect through which changes in the real exchange rate
have an impact on investment expenditures comes from two market imperfec-
tions. First, firms cannot contract debt denominated in non-tradable goods
so that there is a currency mismatch in the non-tradable sector. Second,
because of moral hazard and the impossibility of lenders to perfectly monitor
their loans, the debt contracts limit the amount borrowed by entrepreneurs
to an amount depending on their internal funds.
However, such a self-fulfilling crisis is not always possible and requires cer-
tain conditions to be satisfied. First, the self-reinforcing mechanism requires
the financial accelerator effect to be sufficiently strong. This would not hap-
pen in an economy subject to financial repression. Second, an equilibrium
with defaults only exists when the balance sheets of firms producing non-
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tradable inputs are sufficiently leveraged and/or if the productive structure
of the whole economy is sufficiently oriented toward the production of non-
tradable goods. Therefore, a self-fulfilling balance of payments crisis, though
a contingent event in itself, depends on two structural factors: a firm-level
financial factor and an economy-wide real factor. We have shown that the
evolution of these two factors along any possible equilibrium path leads to
financial fragility provided that the real riskless interest rate is low enough
with regards to the growth rate of the economy, which happens when suffi-
ciently large amounts of international liquidity are available and the economy
is sufficiently opened to foreign capital flows. As an example, we have shown
in a calibration exercise that this might have been the case of Argentina in
the nineties.
Moreover, the same kind of conditions (low international interest rate,
high growth rate, high financial openness) also ensure that adverse unex-
pected shocks trigger a crisis of the same kind as described above. This
is the case of sudden stops, increases in the international interest rate and
adverse movements in the terms of trade.
This paper has several policy implications for an emerging market country
wishing to prevent balance of payments crises. First, it has to pay attention
to mismatches in firm balance sheets, a lesson that is now widely agreed on.26
In particular, if a reform of domestic financial liberalization is believed to lead
to a more developed financial system, an appropriate regulation should be im-
plemented along with this reform to diminish the financial accelerator effect.
Second, it also has to pay a strong attention to changes in the productive
structure. An increase in the relative size of the non-tradable sector with
regards to the tradable sector might make the economy financially fragile
and prone to crises. In times of high international liquidity, a tax on capital
flows set at an adequate level can diminish such an increase while allowing
the economy to reap parts of the benefits of foreign capital inflows.
26See for example Allen, Rosenberg, Keller, Setser & Roubini (2002).
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of proposition 1
An equilibrium real exchange rate is a zero of the function fNN−fII. Suppose
the condition expressed in equation (38) is not satisfied. Then, when pt ≥ pDt ,
one has:
d
dpt
(fNN − fII) = Nt
η
[
1− µγ
1 + s1−α
α
]
− ∂I
T
t
∂pt
− dfII
dpt
≥ Nt
η
[
1− µγ
1 + s1−α
α
− η(1− γ)λ
]
≥ 0
fNN − fII is a continuous and increasing function on the interval [pDt ,+∞[.
Besides, this function goes to +∞ when pt goes to +∞. Therefore, it has a
zero on this interval if and only if (fNN− fII)(pDt ) = fNN(pDt ) ≤ 0. When this
is the case, fNN, which is increasing on [0, p
D
t [, is negative on this interval, so
that fNN − fII = fNN − Zt < 0 when pt < pDt . There cannot be at the same
time an equilibrium with pt ≥ pDt and another with pt < pDt . This proves the
first part of the proposition.
Suppose now that fNN(p
D
t ) > Zt and (fNN − fII)(pBt ) < 0. As fNN is
strictly increasing on [0, pDt [ and negative when pt = 0, there is a unique
42
pLt < p
D
t such that fNN(p
L
t ) = fII(p
L
t ) = Zt. Similarly, fNN− fII is continuous
and strictly increasing on [pBt ,+∞[, and goes to +∞ when pt goes to +∞.
Therefore, there is a unique pHt > p
B
t such that (fNN − fII)(pHt ) = 0.
A.2 Proof of proposition 2
Let Ψρ(φ) =
BN
ΠT
− µγ
1 + s1−α
α
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] − η(1 − γ)λ. The inequality (54)
holds when Ψρ(φ) >
ηZ
ΠT
. When this is the case for ρ = ω, the economy is
financially fragile so that F = 1 and ρ = ω.
Ψρ is a continuous function of φ on the interval
[
1
δρ
,min
(
φ˜(ρ), 1
ρ
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)[
defined by the assumptions 4, 5 and 7. Furthermore, Ψρ(
1
δρ
) < 0 < ηZ
ΠT
.
Therefore, we only have to show that Ψω(φ) > 0 when φ→ min
(
φ˜(ω), 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
to prove the first part of the proposition.
Suppose φ˜(ω) ≤ 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
; then Ψω(φ) −−−−→
φ→φ˜(ω)
+∞. If, on the contrary,
φ˜(ω) > 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
, let us show that Ψω
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
> 0. To simplify notations,
we define x = s(1−α)
α
, a = µγ, b = η(1− γ) and A(φ) = a
1+x
[
1− 1
φ(1−γ)
] .
Ψω
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
=
(λ− 1)[A( 1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
+ bλ
]
λ
δ
− [ δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
][
A
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
+ bλ
] − [A( 1ω δ+λ(1−δ)δ )+ bλ]
= δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
[
A
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
+ bλ
] [
A
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
+ bλ− 1
]
λ
δ
− [ δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
][
A
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
+ bλ
]
> 0
because A
(
1
ω
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
+ bλ− 1 > a
1+x
+ bλ− 1 from assumption 6 and a
1+x
+
bλ− 1 > 0 from assumption 3.
The second part of the proposition comes from the fact that
lim
ω→1
Ψω
(
δ + λ(1− δ)
δ
)
= Ψ1
(
δ + λ(1− δ)
δ
)
> 0
by continuity of the function ω 7→ Ψω
(
δ+λ(1−δ)
δ
)
.
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